## FlashGuard: Leveraging Intrinsic Flash Properties to Defend Against Encryption Ransomware

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## May 12, 2017 WannaCry Ransomware Attack

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# May 12, 2017230,000+ computersWannaCry150+ countriesRansomware Attack\$300-\$600 per ransom















Family	<b>#S</b> amples
Petya	14
CTB-Locker	119
Jigsaw	5
Mobef	7
Maktub	10
Stampado	42
Cerber	29
Locky	344
7ev3n	16
TeslaCrypt	75
HydraCrypt	13
CryptoFortree	4
CrytoWall	799
Total	1477

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# How long does it take for ransomware to finish the attack?

Family	<b>#S</b> amples	Attack Time (min	utes)
Petya	14	2	
CTB-Locker	119	14	
Jigsaw	5	16	
Mobef	7	16	
Maktub	10	22	
Stampado	42	27	
Cerber	29	37	Ask for ransom quickly
Locky	344	43	
7ev3n	16	44	
TeslaCrypt	75	44	
HydraCrypt	13	70	
CryptoFortree	4	75	
CrytoWall	799	75	
Total	1477		

Family	<b>#S</b> amples	Attack Time (minutes)	<b>Backup Spoliation</b>
Petya	14	2	×
CTB-Locker	119	14	×
Jigsaw	5	16	×
Mobef	7	16	×
Maktub	10	22	$\checkmark$
Stampado	42	27	×
Cerber	29	37	$\checkmark$
Locky	344	43	$\checkmark$
7ev3n	16	44	$\checkmark$
TeslaCrypt	75	44	$\checkmark$
HydraCrypt	13	70	$\checkmark$
CryptoFortree	4	75	$\checkmark$
CrytoWall	799	75	
Total	1477		

Family	<b>#S</b> amples		<b>Backup Spoliation</b>
Petya	14		×
CTB-Locker	119		×
Jigsaw	5		
Mobef	7		×
Maktub	10	any ransomware atten	npt 🗸
Stampado	42	to delete backup files	×
Cerber	29	nd bypass Llsor Accoss Contr	
Locky	344	and bypass Oser Access Cond	
7ev3n	16		
TeslaCrypt	75		$\checkmark$
HydraCrypt	13		$\checkmark$
CryptoFortree	4		$\checkmark$
CrytoWall	799		$\checkmark$
Total	1477		





#### Damage has already happened when ransomware is detected





Ransomware with kernel privilege can destroy data backups





#### Increased storage cost & can be stopped by ransomware







Our Goal: defend against encryption ransomware without relying on software-based solutions & without explicit data backups











Significant improvements on Flash

Application

File System

Flash-based Disk

Application

File System

Flash Translation Layer

#### Flash

Application

File System

Flash Translation Layer

Flash

Out-of-Place Update



Application

File System

Flash Translation Layer

Flash

Out-of-Place Update



Application

File System

#### Flash Translation Layer

Flash





Application

File System

#### Flash Translation Layer

Flash



## FlashGuard: Leveraging Intrinsic Flash Properties



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Retaining all the invalid pages (stale data) is expensive



Overwrite on SSD





Only retain the invalid pages caused by encryption ransomware

$$\begin{array}{|c|c|} File & \longrightarrow \\ Read & \longrightarrow \\ Encrypt & \longrightarrow \\ Overwrite \\ \end{array}$$

$$File \longrightarrow Read \longrightarrow Encrypt \longrightarrow Write new files \longrightarrow Delete/Overwrite$$

$$[File] \longrightarrow Read \longrightarrow Encrypt \longrightarrow Overwrite$$

File
$$\longrightarrow$$
 Read $\longrightarrow$  Encrypt $\longrightarrow$  Write new files $\bigcirc$  Overwrite

$$[File] \longrightarrow Read \longrightarrow Encrypt \longrightarrow Overwrite$$

$$\mathsf{File} \longrightarrow \mathsf{Read} \longrightarrow \mathsf{Encrypt} \longrightarrow \mathsf{Write new files} \longrightarrow \mathsf{Overwrite}$$

#### FlashGuard only retains invalid pages that have been read for a certain period of time





























#### Leveraging OOB metadata to retrieve index information for recovery









#### Programmable SSD

1 TB 64 pages/block 4 KB/page over-provisioning ratio: 15%

# FlashGuard Experimental Setup

#### Programmable SSD

1 TB 64 pages/block 4 KB/page over-provisioning ratio: 15%

# Ransomware Samples

1,477 ransomware samples (VirusTotal)

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#### Storage Workloads

Enterprise servers (11 workloads) University machines (6 workloads) Storage benchmarks: IOZone/Postmark Database workloads (TPCC/TPCE)

# FlashGuard Experimental Setup

# **Recovery Time of Ransomware Samples**



# **Recovery Time of Ransomware Samples**



# Impact on Regular Storage Operations



FlashGuard decreases the storage performance by 6% for I/O-intensive workloads

# Impact on SSD Lifetime



FlashGuard increases the WAF by 4% due to the additional page movements in GC

# Potential Attacks and Future Work



# Potential Attacks and Future Work


### Potential Attacks and Future Work



## FlashGuard Summary

#### Hardware-assisted Defense Against Encryption Ransomware

#### Negligible Impact on SSD performance & lifetime

# Thanks!

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A&O